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JURISDICTION
 This Court has jurisdiction over final judgments of the district courts pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008).   
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
 Whether the trial court properly granted Thomas G. Hicks’ (“Hicks”) motion to 
vacate the arbitration award on the basis that Hicks was denied his rights to present 
evidence and cross-examine witnesses as guaranteed by Utah statute.   
 Standard of Review:  In reviewing a district court’s order vacating an arbitration 
award, this Court reviews the district court’s conclusions of law for correctness and 
reviews the district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.  See, 
e.g., Softsolutions v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095, 1099 (Utah 2000).   
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
I. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124 (2008) provides: 
(1)  Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the 
court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: 
 
(a)  the award was procured by corruption fraud, or other undue 
means; 
 
 (b)  there was: 
 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral 
arbitrator; 
  (ii)  corruption by an arbitrator; or 
 (iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a 
party to the arbitration proceeding; 
 
 (c)  an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of 
sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence 
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing 
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contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to substantially prejudice the 
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
 
 (d)  an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s authority; 
 
 (e)  there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person 
participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising an 
objection under Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later than the 
beginning of the arbitration hearing; or 
 
 (f)  the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the 
initiation of an arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to 
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration 
proceeding. 
 
II. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-116 (2008) provides: 
 
(1)  An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in a manner the arbitrary 
considers appropriate for a fair and expeditions disposition of the 
proceeding.  The authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the power 
to hold conferences with the parties to the arbitration proceeding before the 
hearing and, among other matters, determine the admissibility, relevance, 
materiality, and weight of any evidence. 
 
. . . . 
 
(4)  At a hearing under Subsection (3), a party to the arbitration proceeding 
has a right to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and 
to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing. 
 
. . . . 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
 This appeal arises from the district court’s decision to vacate an arbitration award 
because Hicks’ ability to present material evidence and cross-examine a key witness was 
substantially hindered by the arbitration panel’s (“the Panel”) denial of Hicks’ request for 
certain information undisputedly in UBS’s possession.  
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 From July 2006 until November 2007, UBS Financial Services, Inc. (“UBS”) and 
Hicks arbitrated their dispute arising out of Hicks’ employment with UBS.  UBS sought 
to recover under two promissory notes signed by Hicks at the time he accepted an offer to 
work for UBS.  (See Statement of Claim, R. 189-246.)  Hicks sought recovery of unpaid 
commissions from UBS for his referral to UBS of the companies Extra Space Storage, 
Inc. (“Extra Space”) and Infinite Energy Company (“Infinite Energy”).  (See Hicks’ 
Answer to Statement of Claim and Statement of Counterclaim, R. 248-56.)  After a 
hearing on the matter, the Panel awarded Hicks approximately $161,000 in referral fees 
that UBS had failed to pay him and awarded UBS the principal amount of approximately 
$647,000 under the promissory notes.  (See Amended Award, R. 329.)   
 In February 2008, Hicks filed a petition and motion to vacate the Award and UBS 
filed a petition to confirm the Award.  (See R. 6-21; R. 1-12 (Case No. 2321).)  On July 
8, 2008, the district court issued a memorandum decision (“Memorandum Decision”), 
wherein the district court addressed the question of “whether the arbitration panel’s 
denial of [Hicks’] request for certain discovery, including deposing a UBS corporate 
representative, constitutes a ground for vacating that panel’s arbitration award.”  
(Memorandum Decision, R. 373.)  The district court granted Hicks’ petition to vacate, 
finding that “the panel’s decision hindered [Hicks’] ability to present material evidence 
and his ability to adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman, who was clearly a key witness 
in the arbitration proceeding.”  (Id.)   
 On September 30, 2008, the district entered an order and final judgment vacating 
the Award based on the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision.  (See Order and 
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Judgment Vacating Arbitration Award and Directing Rehearing, R. 411-12.)  On October 
24, 2008, UBS filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 413-15.)   
 Statement of Facts 
1. On September 14, 2000, UBS hired Hicks as a financial advisor in the Salt 
Lake City, Utah branch office. (See Hicks Declaration, R. 23.) 
2. UBS offered Hicks a substantial signing bonus if he would bring his 
significant book of business with him and accept an employment position at UBS.  (See 
id., R. 24.)  
3. Upon accepting the offer, UBS required Hicks to sign certain contracts 
including two promissory notes (the “Notes”) that stated if he terminated his employment 
with UBS, he would be required to pay back the signing bonus.  Hicks was told at the 
time that he needed to sign the Notes because that was how UBS handled the signing 
bonus for tax and accounting purposes.  (See id.) 
4. According to their terms, the Notes were forgivable if Hicks stayed 
working for UBS for at least ten years.  (See id.)  
5. On February 27, 2006, approximately six years after he was hired, Hicks 
left his employment with UBS.  (See id.) 
6. Upon Hicks leaving the firm, UBS took the position that he owed it roughly 
$650,000 for his alleged breach of the Notes.  UBS filed a claim for arbitration to recover 
money Hicks allegedly owed it.  (See id.) 
7. Hicks filed a counterclaim to recover unpaid commissions from UBS for 
his referral to UBS of the companies Extra Space and Infinite Energy, resulting in 
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millions of dollars of work.  It was undisputed at arbitration that Hicks referred these 
companies to UBS; the only question at issue was how much money Hicks was entitled 
to as a result of the work he referred to UBS. (See id.) 
8. During the arbitration proceedings, it became clear to Hicks that any 
amount he allegedly owed to UBS on the Notes would be more than fully offset by the 
amount he was owed for unpaid commissions for the Extra Space deals and any deals 
involving Infinite Energy.  Hicks recognized that there most certainly would be 
documents evidencing UBS’s business interactions with Extra Space and Infinite Energy.  
(See id., R. 25.) 
9.   Accordingly, on December 28, 2006, Hicks requested to take the 
deposition of a corporate representative knowledgeable about the scope and content of 
requested documents regarding UBS’s interactions with Extra Space and Infinite Energy. 
(See id.; see also Hicks’s Request for Depositions, R.31-34.)  The Panel denied Hicks’s 
request.  (See Discovery Order dated March 29, 2007, R. 36-38.)   
10. Hicks also requested to take the deposition of Virginia Weisman, UBS 
Executive Director, Business Development Group, so that Hicks could better understand 
the details of the Extra Space and Infinite Energy deals, and UBS’s referral policy.  (See 
Hicks’s Request for Depositions, R.31-34.)  The Panel denied Hicks’s request to take Ms. 
Weisman’s deposition but did direct Ms. Weisman to appear and give testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing and to produce all documents in her custody pertaining to the unpaid 
commissions due and owing to Hicks.  (See Hicks Decl., R. 25; Discovery Order dated 
March 29, 2007, R. 36-38.) 
 5  
11. UBS informed Hicks that there were no documents responsive to his 
request regarding any Infinite Energy deals.  (See Letter from Hicks to UBS dated Sept. 
14, 2007, R. 40.)  However, on September 7, 2007, Hicks was notified by Infinite Energy 
that it did have documents evidencing a deal between UBS and Infinite Energy.  (See 
Hicks Decl., R. 25.)   
12. The document produced by Infinite Energy evidences a Term Loan Facility 
Commitment Letter between UBS and Infinite Energy dated September 19, 2005 (the 
“Infinite Agreement”). (See Infinite Agreement, R. 42-64.)  According to the Infinite 
Agreement, UBS entered into a financial transaction whereby it would finance Infinite 
Energy with seventy-five (75) million dollars to acquire another company.  (See id.)  The 
Infinite Agreement provided for certain fee terms and also provided that UBS would act 
as the sole and exclusive advisor, arranger and book manager for the term loan facility 
and would exclusively manage the syndication of the term loan facility.  (See id.)  The 
Infinite Agreement was signed by the president of Infinite Energy and by two officers of 
UBS: James P. Boland and Warren Jervey.  (See id.; Hicks Decl., R. 25-26.)  
13. Hicks never received a referral fee for his role in directing Infinite Energy 
to UBS.  Under the referral structure that UBS applied to Hicks for his referral of Extra 
Space, he stood to receive a commission on the Infinite Agreement of at least $750,000.  
(See Hicks Decl., R. 26.) 
14. On October 23, 2007, Ms. Weisman submitted an Affirmation stating, 
among other things, that “[b]ased on the search [she] conducted, no responsive 
documents exist with respect to any deal involving UBS and Infinite Energy because no 
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such deal was ever completed.”  (Weisman Affirmation, R. 66-68.)  In her Affirmation, 
Ms. Weisman states that she spoke to Christopher Abbate regarding the Infinite Energy 
deal, yet she does not state that she even spoke with Mr. Boland or Mr. Jervey about 
Infinite Energy – the two UBS officers who signed the Infinite Agreement.  (See id.)   
15. In light of Infinite Energy’s production of the Infinite Agreement and Ms. 
Weisman’s failure to speak with Mr. Boland or Mr. Jervey about the Infinite Agreement, 
UBS most certainly possesses documents that reference the multi-million dollar Infinite 
Agreement – such as email and correspondence to, from, and between Mr. Boland, Mr. 
Jervey, and Infinite Energy.  Other Infinite deals may have existed as a result of Hicks’ 
referral of the company to UBS but Hicks has no way of knowing this.  (See Hicks Decl., 
R. 26.) 
16. The Panel’s decision denying Hicks’ request to take the deposition of a 
corporate representative knowledgeable about the scope and content of requested 
documents regarding UBS’s interactions with Infinite Energy prevented Hicks from 
discovering documents that, in light of the above, are more than likely in the possession 
of UBS.  And having been denied access to such documents, Hicks was also denied of the 
opportunity to use such relevant documents to cross-examine Ms. Weisman regarding her 
Affirmation.  (See id., R. 27.) 
17. Hicks also requested UBS to produce documents evidencing exactly how 
much was made in fees on at least four deals for Extra Space.  Some documents were 
produced but not all.  (See id.)  
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18. The Panel’s decision denying Hicks’s deposition requests also denied Hicks 
the opportunity to determine exactly how much money UBS had received in the business 
transactions with Extra Space that UBS alleges to have consummated.  If there was more 
money received as a result of transactions between UBS and Extra Space, Hicks would 
be entitled to a referral fee based on that money.  (See id.)   
19. During the arbitration proceeding, UBS alleged to have provided Hicks 
with a policy presentation in 2003 that outlined the referral fees that he could expect to 
obtain when referring clients to UBS. Hicks never received this policy presentation.  
Consequently, Hicks requested the Software Metadata for this 2003 document to 
determine whether the document was even created in 2003.  UBS never produced this 
information even though it was repeatedly requested.  (See id.) 
20. Although Hicks had been paid some fees for his referral of Extra Space 
while he was employed by UBS, he was not paid what he was rightfully owed; Hicks was 
entitled to more fees.  (See id., R. 28.)  For instance, Hicks was not aware of two other 
deals between UBS and Extra Space that UBS admitted at arbitration had in fact taken 
place.  Moreover, Hicks cannot determine exactly how much he was owed for the first 
three deals because he did not have an opportunity to determine what documents existed 
relating to fees received by UBS for those deals and simply had to rely upon UBS to 
provide piecemeal parts of documents relating to those deals.  Hicks was not afforded the 
opportunity to depose the agent for UBS who had knowledge of where all of the 
documents relating to these deals existed.  (See id.) 
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21. The Arbitration Panel agreed that Hicks was entitled to more fees than UBS 
originally paid him.  On January 3, 2008, the Arbitration Panel awarded Hicks 
$54,445.31 plus interest as compensatory damages for the Extra Space IPO deal, and 
$106,682.40 plus interest as compensatory damages on the Extra Space Private Equity 
deal.  Had Hicks been afforded full opportunity to receive all documents relating to these 
deals, he would have received more money from the Panel.  (See Panel’s Amendment to 
Award, R. 70-77; Hicks Decl., R. 28.) 
22. Including interest, the Panel awarded UBS damages in the amount of 
approximately $766,000.  (See Panel’s Amendment to Award, R. 70-77.)  The amounts 
that UBS was directed to pay Hicks – approximately $161,000, plus interest – are to be 
off-set against the amounts Hicks owes UBS.  (See id., R. 73-74.)  
23. On February 4, 2008, Hicks filed an amended petition and motion to vacate 
the Award on the basis that he was denied his rights to present material evidence and 
cross-examine witnesses as guaranteed by Utah statute.  (See Mem. Supp. Am. Pet. and 
Mot. to Vacate Arbitration Award, R. 8-21.) 
24. On July 8, 2008, Judge Faust issued the Memorandum Decision, wherein 
he addressed the question of “whether the arbitration panel’s denial of [Hicks’] request 
for certain discovery, including deposing a UBS corporate representative, constitutes a 
ground for vacating that panel’s arbitration award.”  (Memorandum Decision, R. 373.)  
Judge Faust stated that “[t]he Court is convinced that in reading the various arbitration 
statutes together, discovery decisions which result in the denial of a participant’s rights to 
present material evidence, thereby substantially prejudicing that individual, can provide 
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the grounds for vacatur. [UBS’s] reliance on the Buzas case as somehow suggesting 
otherwise is misplaced.”  (Id., R. 374.) 
25. Judge Faust granted Hicks’ petition to vacate, finding that “the panel’s 
decision hindered [Hicks’] ability to present material evidence and his ability to 
adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman, who was clearly a key witness in the arbitration 
proceeding.”  (Id., R. 373.)  
26. On September 30, 2008, the district entered an order and final judgment 
vacating the Award based on the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision.  (See 
Order and Judgment Vacating Arbitration Award and Directing Rehearing, R. 411-12.)  
The district court directed that “[t]he rehearing shall be conducted in a manner that will 
not again prejudice Hicks’ rights and otherwise comports with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
11-116 (formerly 78-31a-116).”  (Id., R. 412.)  Accordingly, at a minimum, the 
arbitration panel on rehearing should allow Hicks to depose a UBS corporate 
representative so that he could determine who would have documents regarding the 
Infinite Agreement—such as the two officers who signed the agreement—and then 
follow-up with additional discovery so that he could fairly present his case. (See id., R. 
411-12; Memorandum Decision, R. 373-74.)   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its brief to this Court, UBS does its best to ignore the heart of the issue in this 
case.  Namely, UBS fails to adequately discuss the $75 million term loan facility 
commitment letter between UBS and Infinite Energy (the “Infinite Agreement”)—an 
agreement signed by two UBS officers that was produced during the arbitration by third-
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party, Florida company, Infinite Energy.  During the arbitration, UBS failed to produce 
this decisive document or any other document or email regarding the Infinite Agreement.  
It is undisputed that if the Infinite Agreement was indeed consummated, Hicks would be 
entitled to a referral fee for his work in directing Infinite Energy, Inc. to UBS—a referral 
fee which would have exceeded the total amount awarded to UBS at arbitration.  Instead 
of producing critical evidence, Ms. Virginia Weisman, a UBS employee, signed an 
affirmation stating that there were no deals consummated between UBS and Infinite 
Energy and that UBS had no documents in its possession regarding the Infinite 
Agreement (an astonishing suggestion given the production of the document by Infinite 
Energy, the value of the agreement, and the use of email in today’s business world).  Ms. 
Weisman, however, admittedly failed to even talk to the two UBS employees who signed 
the multi-million dollar Infinite Agreement.  Hicks expressly requested the Panel to 
require UBS to produce all evidence regarding Infinite Energy and to allow Hicks to 
depose a UBS corporate representative so that he could determine who would have 
documents regarding the Infinite Agreement—such as the two officers who signed the 
agreement—and then follow-up with additional discovery so that he could fairly present 
his case.  The Panel denied Hicks’ request.  For this and other reasons, Hicks was denied 
of his rights to present evidence and adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman with 
controverting documents.  The only evidence at the arbitration regarding whether the 
Infinite Energy deal was consummated was Ms. Weisman.  Hicks had no way of 
presenting any other evidence on this critical issue because UBS stonewalled Hicks and 
the Panel regarding this evidence.         
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In light of these facts, it is absolutely no surprise that Judge Faust found that 
Hicks’ rights were not respected at the arbitration.  Hicks was denied his rights to present 
evidence and cross examine witnesses as guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-
124(1)(c) and § 78B-11-116.   Such a denial of rights unequivocally supports vacating the 
Award.  But instead of agreeing to return to arbitration where the parties could quickly 
resolve the unaddressed issues surrounding the Infinite Agreement, UBS continues to 
refuse to recognize Hicks’ rights to fairly present his case.1   
This case presents a perfect example of why the district courts have authority 
under specific state statutes to vacate arbitration awards when an aggrieved party is not 
allowed to present evidence and cross examine witnesses.  Hicks respectfully requests the 
Court to deny UBS’s appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT HICKS WAS DENIED 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND ADEQUATELY 
CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES DURING THE ARBITRATION 
 
The trial court correctly found that the Panel denied Hicks of his rights under Utah 
statute to present evidence and cross examine witnesses.  The Panel denied Hicks’ 
request to require UBS to produce all evidence regarding Infinite Energy and to allow 
Hicks to depose a UBS corporate representative so that he could determine who would 
have documents regarding the Infinite Agreement.  Accordingly, Hicks was denied of his 
rights to present evidence and adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman with 
controverting documents.  At the hearing, Hicks had no way of presenting any other 
                                              
1 UBS’s continued and repeated resistance suggests that there is evidence in its possession that UBS is trying 
desperately not to provide to Hicks.   
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evidence on this critical issue because UBS stonewalled Hicks and the Panel regarding 
this evidence.  And in light of the Infinite Agreement and the flawed affirmation of Ms. 
Weisman, UBS possesses evidence that would significantly impact, if not entirely negate, 
the Award.  Judge Faust’s order was correct for all of these reasons.   
A. Discovery Decisions Which Result in the Denial of a Participant’s 
Rights to Present Evidence or Cross-Examine Witnesses Provide 
Grounds for Vacatur 
 
Utah courts can and should vacate an arbitration award if the substantial rights of 
the parties were not respected.  See Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 
941 (Utah 1996).  The Buzas court noted that a court’s review of an arbitration award 
“should be limited to the statutory grounds and procedures for review.”  Id. at 947.  Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(c) provides that a court shall vacate an award made in the 
arbitration proceeding if an arbitrator “refused to consider evidence material to the 
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to 
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.”  Section 78B-
11-116(4) dictates that “a party to the arbitration proceeding has a right to be heard, to 
present evidence material to the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at 
the hearing.”   
As was explained by Judge Faust in the Memorandum Decision, when “reading 
the various arbitration statutes together, discovery decisions which result in the denial of 
a participant’s rights to present material evidence, thereby substantially prejudicing that 
individual, can provide the grounds for vacatur.”  (Memorandum Decision, R. 374.)  The 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-124(1)(c) and 78B-11-116 strongly 
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supports such a statement.  A party to an arbitration is guaranteed the rights to present 
material evidence and cross-examine witnesses.  See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-
124(1)(c) and 78B-11-116.  These statutes make no distinction and provide no carve-outs 
regarding the means by which a party was denied his or her rights to present material 
evidence or cross-examine witnesses.  See id.  A party’s rights under these statutes are 
either respected, or they are not.  See Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 946-48.        
UBS contends that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-118, regarding an arbitrator’s 
discretion with respect to discovery, somehow bars any possible vacatur based on the 
denial of discovery, even if the discovery decision resulted in the denial of a participant’s 
rights to present material evidence or cross-examine witnesses.  (See Appellant’s Br. at 
23-24.)  This argument is misplaced.  Under UBS’s proposed theory, an arbitration panel 
could prohibit any and all discovery to one party, while granting broad discovery to the 
other party, and the party who was denied any and all discovery would have no basis for 
vacating an award against him.  Clearly, such a denial of discovery would prejudice the 
aggrieved party, and such a process could hardly be deemed fair.  Furthermore, a party 
who is denied such discovery would likely be denied the opportunity to present material 
evidence and adequately cross-examine witnesses.  See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-116.  
An arbitrator’s discretion regarding discovery matters is not and cannot be unchecked, 
otherwise, the due process protections under Utah law would be critically undermined.      
UBS is asking the Court to ignore the controlling Utah statutes and reverse the 
district court.  The facts and relevant statutes, however, cannot be ignored.  Discovery 
decisions which result in the denial of a party’s rights to present material evidence and 
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cross-examine witnesses provide the grounds for vacatur.  See Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d 
at 946-48; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-124(1)(c) and 78B-11-116; Memorandum 
Decision, R. 373-74.  And in this case, there is no question that Hicks was substantially 
prejudiced by the Panel’s denial of his rights to present material evidence and cross-
examine a key witness. 
B. Hicks Was Denied His Rights to Present Evidence and Cross-Examine 
a Key Witness, Resulting in Substantial Prejudice  
 
Hicks was wrongfully denied access to critical evidence regarding Infinite Energy.  
On October 23, 2007, Ms. Weisman submitted an Affirmation stating, among other 
things, that “[b]ased on the search [she] conducted, no responsive documents exist with 
respect to any deal involving UBS and Infinite Energy because no such deal was ever 
completed.”  (Weisman Affirmation, R. 68.)  Directly contradicting that Affirmation, 
however, is the Infinite Agreement produced by Infinite Energy.  (See Infinite 
Agreement, R. 42-64.)  The $75 million Infinite Agreement was not only signed by the 
president of Infinite Energy, but was also signed by two UBS officers—James P. Boland 
and Warren Jervey. (See id.)  Further casting doubt on the validity of Ms. Weisman’s 
Affirmation is the fact that Ms. Weisman spoke to Mr. Abbate, and only Mr. Abbate, 
regarding the Infinite Energy deal.  (Weisman Affirmation, R. 67.)  In other words, Ms. 
Weisman failed to even speak with the two UBS officers who actually signed the Infinite 
Agreement.  Common sense establishes that a company that signs a contract worth 
around $75 million is likely to have at least some emails, letters, or other written 
correspondence addressing such a deal, even if the contract or transaction was never 
“finalized” as alleged by Ms. Weisman.  The fact that UBS failed to produce a single 
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email or correspondence regarding the deal suggests that UBS is hiding facts.   
By denying Hicks access to information that, in light of the above, almost 
certainly would lead to the discovery of relevant documents, Hicks was unable to 
discover and present material and decisive evidence and adequately cross-examine Ms. 
Weisman with controverting documents.  See Utah Code Ann. 78B-11-116(4).   And 
because Hicks would have been entitled to a substantial referral fee for his work in 
directing Infinite Energy to UBS, the Panel’s denial substantially prejudiced Hicks.  (See 
Hicks Decl., R. 26.)  Consequently, the Award was rightfully vacated by the trial court.   
 Hicks was also denied his substantial rights with respect to his request of the 
Metadata of a referral fee policy presentation.  During the Arbitration proceeding, UBS 
alleged to have provided Hicks with a policy presentation in 2003 that outlined the 
referral fees that he could expect to obtain when referring clients to UBS.  Hicks never 
received this policy presentation.  (See Hicks Decl., R. 27.)    Consequently, Hicks 
requested the Software Metadata for this 2003 document to determine whether the 
document was even created in 2003.  Hicks made repeated requests for this information.  
Despite these requests, both to UBS as well as to the Panel, UBS never produced this 
information.  (See Hicks Decl., R. 27.) 
Hicks was denied information that could completely change the outcome of the 
arbitration proceeding, and in light of the Infinite Agreement and the flawed affirmation, 
there is strong reason to believe that granting Hicks access to the requested information 
and allowing him to present that evidence and adequately cross-examine witnesses would 
drastically change the Award.  In other words, these denials substantially prejudiced 
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Hicks.  Accordingly, this Court should deny UBS’s appeal.   
II. UBS PROVIDES NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS FOR OVERTURNING 
THE ORDER VACATING THE ARBITRATION AWARD 
 
In addition to the arguments addressed above, UBS asserts arguments for 
overturning the appeal based on the limited discovery in arbitrations, the alleged strength 
of Ms. Weisman’s affirmation, and Utah’s public policy favoring arbitration.  These 
arguments all fail. 
First, UBS emphasizes the fact that depositions are discouraged at arbitration and 
that FINRA arbitrators may permit depositions only in limited circumstances.  (See 
Appellant’s Br. at 26.)  The fact there is generally limited discovery in arbitrations and 
the fact that discovery matters rest with the arbitrator is mostly irrelevant to this dispute, 
and UBS’ focus on “discovery” is simply misplaced.  See Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947; Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(c).  The issue before this Court is whether the Panel failed to 
respect Hicks’ substantial rights under Utah law.  See Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947; Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(c).  As explained above, Hicks was denied the opportunity to 
present evidence and cross examine witnesses—rights that are afforded to parties in an 
arbitration.  See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-116.  There is no dispute that the Panel had 
the authority to grant Hicks’ request to depose a UBS representative.  And in light of the 
Infinite Agreement and the subsequent and questionable affirmation of Ms. Weisman, the 
Panel not only had the authority to allow for such a deposition, but the obligation.  (See 
Infinite Agreement, R. 42-64; Weisman Affirmation, R. 66-68.)     
Second, UBS’s argument that Ms. Weisman’s testimony and affirmation somehow 
erases all doubt as to whether there was a consummated deal between UBS and Infinite 
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Energy fails because (1) there is a signed document between UBS and Infinite Energy 
purportedly demonstrating a $75 million deal and (2) Ms. Weisman did not even speak to 
the two UBS representatives who signed the document to determine whether there was a 
deal consummated.  (See Infinite Agreement, R. 42-64; Weisman Affirmation, R. 67-68.)  
Common sense establishes that a company that signs a contract worth around $75 million 
is likely to have at least some emails, letters, or other written correspondence addressing 
such a deal, even if the contract or transaction was never “finalized” as alleged by Ms. 
Weisman.  (Weisman Affirmation, R. 66-68.)  UBS has provided no factual or legal 
arguments that would support overturning Judge Faust’s thoughtful decision in this case.  
 Finally, UBS’s arguments based on Utah’s public policy favoring arbitration rings 
hollow when compared to the bedrock principle of due process.  (See Appellant’s Br. at 
27-30.)  It is true that Utah has a public policy favoring “speedy and inexpensive methods 
of adjudicating disputes.”  Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 
1268 (Utah 1996).  But this public policy in no way trumps a party’s fundamental right to 
be heard and present evidence.  See Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 
1075 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that an arbitration must meet the requirements of due 
process).  The Utah Legislature recognized this fact and provided express statutes 
guaranteeing a party to an arbitration the “right to be heard, to present evidence material 
to the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses . . . .”  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-116.   
 Hicks was denied his rights to present evidence and cross examine witnesses as 
guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(c) and § 78B-11-116.  Hicks obtained a 
piece of critical evidence from a third-party that, on its face, dictates that Hicks should 
 18  
have received $750,000 from UBS for referring Infinite Energy to UBS.  (See Infinite 
Agreement, R. 42-64; Hicks Decl., R. 25-26.)  Such a fee completely negates the Award 
and may result in Hicks receiving an award against UBS at the rehearing of this matter.  
To deny Hicks the opportunity to access and then present documents and depositions 
testimony evidence is patently unfair and denies Hicks of his rights as guaranteed under 
Utah statute.  Such a denial of rights unequivocally supports affirming the trial court’s 
vacatur of the Award.     
CONCLUSION
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the rulings of the district court 
in this matter.   
DATED this _____ day of April 2009. 
       RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
 
       /s/ Greggory J. Savage    
       Greggory J. Savage 
       Matthew N. Evans 
       Attorneys for Hicks 
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